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While the existing transportation infrastructure is aging, travel demand is continually increasing. 2
The traditional funding sources for transportation projects are unable to keep up with the 3 growing demands on the nation's highway infrastructure. Transportation acts, such as ISTEA, 4 TEA-21, and SAFETEA-LU allowed for innovative financing tools, which provided flexibility 5 for implementation of tolling and also encouraged the states to pursue private participation in the 6 development and operation of transportation infrastructure (1) . Several alternative approaches 7 have been explored for infrastructure development in order to serve increasing travel demands 8 and facilitate economic growth. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have emerged as one such 9 mechanism through which public transportation agencies partner with private entities to develop 10 and manage capital intensive transportation projects (2). 11
Three key economic objectives behind toll roads have been cited by planners: the 12 improved efficiency and effectiveness in infrastructure management through private sector 13 participation, the ability to finance infrastructure independent of public investment, and the 14 pursuit of an 'economic optimum' (3) in infrastructure operation and maintenance. Based on the 15 degree of risk shared by the public and private entities involved, different partnership structures 16 have evolved over the years. One such model that is increasingly gaining popularity and 17 acceptance is the Design Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) model. DBFO business model is a 18 form of concession, in which the private entity obtains a contract to design, finance, build, 19 operate, and collect tolls on the road for a specified time period, following which ownership of 20 the facility is restored to the public sector. The three parties involved in a typical DBFO 21 project-governmental highway agency or state Department of Transportation (DOT), private 22 sector developers, and road users-all take different roles and responsibilities 23 24
Role of the Public Sector 25 A PPP changes the traditional role the DOTs play in the development, operation and 26 management of the highway infrastructure. The DOTs, whose primary objective is social and 27 economic welfare through the provision of safe, comfortable roads and reliable transportation 28 means, traditionally assume the leading role in the operation and maintenance of highways. In a 29 PPP, the contractual agreement creates and defines the obligations between the State DOTs and 30 private entities and lays out the terms and standards that should be met by the concessionaire. 31
The State DOT involved is responsible for the approval of tolls to be charged to the road users 32 and the maintenance of a certain level of condition of the highway infrastructure. 33
The users of toll roads are primarily interested in minimizing travel time and costs while 34 maintaining a comfortable and safe ride. The highway agency manages costs and the level of 35 roadway conditions through stipulations in the contract agreement specifying tolling policies and 36 a minimum acceptable condition of the roadway system. 37 38
Role of the Private Sector 39
The private sector makes capital investment to provide agreed highway management service 40 through all the design, build, and finance and operate phases. One of the drivers for the private 41 sector to be involved in a PPP project is to achieve a return on investment on the equity invested 42 and to control investment risks. Toll-pricing strategies are the most important tool for the private 43 parties to achieve their financial goals. Simply setting toll rates to the highest allowed value 44 according to the specification of tolling policies in the contract agreement is not always the 45 wisest strategy for the private sector to operate the highway facility in the long term. Although 46
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higher tolls usually increase revenues at the very beginning, they would also result in reduced 1 users and thereby reduce toll revenues. On the other hand, very low toll rates or no cost may 2 attract more traffic at first, but such a strategy can lead to traffic jams and thus increase the 3 overall cost for motorists. In addition, number of vehicles using the toll road would accelerate 4 the pavement deterioration process, increase maintenance and rehabilitation costs and, in turn, 5 lead to reduced profit. As described above, traffic volume on a tolled highway-known as the 6 demand function-responds to toll pricing changes and is dynamic in nature. 7
The focus of this paper to investigate toll pricing that would help improve mobility, 8 secure the public interest reduce the overall cost of motorists and attract private-sector 9 investment in a DBFO partnership. As it was briefly discussed, an optimal toll-pricing plan is 10 contingent upon several factors. It calls for a trade-off that would yield an optimal solution for 11 the system. Additionally, the system is dynamic in nature, as there are lagged dependent 12 variables in the demand function and the pavement deterioration function. One year is used as 13 the unit time interval to study this dynamic process, which means that the toll price is assumed to 14 be fixed for each year, and that it will not fluctuate with traffic congestions in real time. A 15 dynamic toll-pricing model is developed in this study with the use of the General Algebraic 16
Modeling System (GAMS), where the applicability of deterministic dynamic optimization 17 models is examined for determining toll pricing in a DBFO partnership.
18
The rest of the discussions are organized as follows. In Section 2, a literature review of 19 previous studies on determination of toll pricing strategies is presented. In Section 3, a 20 deterministic dynamic toll-pricing model is present and explained. A number of efforts have been undertaken to study issues regarding toll pricing strategies and 28 regulation policy in PPP projects from different perspectives (4-12). While many papers focus on 29 reducing the network congestion by imposing tolls (4-7), other papers aim to explore how toll 30 strategies would influence the performances and financial feasibility of a PPP projects (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) .
31
Yang and Meng (8, 9 ) explored the use of bi-level mathematical programming formulations to 32 investigate the feasibility of a candidate build-operate-transfer (BOT) project for a given 33 highway network and to determine the optimal toll rates and capacity of a new highway under 34 various market conditions. Ferrari (10) presented a definition of optimal road tolls which aimed 35 to share the costs between motorists and public financial so that social welfare was maximized.
36
In the paper, an optimization model was proposed to calculate the toll rates under the definition 37 of optimal road tolls, and the model was applied to a real case in Italy. The results from the case 38 study indicated that the optimal toll rates were influence heavily by the marginal costs of public 39 funds and motorists' willingness to pay. Chen and Subprasom (11) developed a set of road 40 pricing models to determine the optimal pricing strategies in a BOT scheme under demand 41 uncertainty, considering the objectives of the government, the private investors, and the road 42 users. They evaluated seven cases of BOT arrangements using the Ban Pong-Kanchanaburi 43
Motorway (BKM) project in Thailand in the case study, and concluded that different objectives 44 and regulation lead to different toll pricing strategies and financial performance. 45
Common limitations of these studies include that 1) they did not consider the pavement 1 deterioration process and how it impacts the motorists on their route choice; 2) they did not 2 optimize the pavement maintenance and rehabilitation (M&R) schedule to save costs. To 3 overcome these limitations, this study proposed an optimization model to not only consider the 4 impact of traditional factors (e.g., travel costs) on motorists' choice but also capture the influence 5 of M&R activities on traffic demand. Under such model, the optimal toll strategy is determined 6 along with the optimal toll road M&R schedule. 7 8 9
DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION MODEL FOR TOLL PRICING STRATEGIES 10
In this paper, the financial performance of a DBFO project is discussed at the project level. 11
Therefore, the tolls charged, demand function, and the deterioration function are treated as 12 homogenous for the entire stretch of a toll roadway section being analyzed. 13 14 Profit 15
For any private sector involved in the DBFO partnership, the primary concern is profit 16 maximization. The annual profit for a private party can be expressed as the difference between 17 the revenue generated through the toll road operation and the costs incurred: 18 where = profit in year n, 19 = revenue generated in year n, and 20 = total costs incurred as a result of operating the toll road in year n. 21 22
Revenue function 23
The annual revenue generated from operating the toll road can be expressed as the product of the 24 number of road users patronizing the toll road and the toll charge: 25 where = average daily traffic volume in year n, and 26 = toll charged to a road user. 27 More specifically, is measured in terms of the annual average daily traffic (AADT), a 28 parameter that describes the traffic volume. The vehicle configurations are assumed to remain 29 consistent for the duration of the project. The parameter converts daily traffic volume into 30 annual traffic volume In some PPP projects, the project concession agreements may address the 31 upper limits for tolls that can be charged to a road user, and this can be considered in the model 32 by the following constraint: 33 where, is the maximum toll rate that can be charged to a road user. 34 35
Demand function 36
The traffic volume on a tolled highway depends on many influencing factors, including the toll 37 charged, the ride quality of the toll way experienced by the road users, ride quality offered by 38 alternative routes and modes, current gas price, the level of economic activity during the period, 39
and other factors (14). A linear model was used to describe the relationship between traffic 40 volume and toll rate as well as those other factors discussed: 41 where and = average daily traffic volumes in a year n and its previous year, 1 = state variable that describes the prevailing pavement condition, 2 = an exogenous variable for the overall impact of economic factors (i.e., gas 3 price) and level of economic activity, 4 = original designed toll rate, and 5 = desired pavement conditions. 6
The parameter denotes a constant rate of the increase in traffic volume over N years. 7 The term in the model is included to take into account the consistency in travel behaviors 8 of road users. The specification of the initial value can reflect the origin-destination (O-D) 9 characteristics for a particular project. The term describes the phenomena that 10 some travelers would switch to alternative routes if the toll rates were increased. The term 11
indicates the impact that the factors such as pavement condition and ride 12 quality have on the choices that road users make. By such a definition, the demand function 13 reflects the motorists' responses on their overall travel cost which takes estimated travel time 14 values, tolls, travel experience, and gas expenditure into consideration. 15
Several sources discuss the demand elasticity on tolled highways and various models 16 have been developed to describe the demand function. Since the primary objective for this study 17 was to assess how optimal control theory can be used to evaluate optimal pricing in a DBFO 18
project, a linear function in system equations was used. 
Pavement deterioration function 1
Pavement condition is a function of the pavement deterioration process which is continuous in 2 the intervals between subsequent M&R activities. Different indices are used to reflect the 3 pavement condition from different aspects (16) (17) (18) . This study adopts an index that measures the 4 pavement condition by its roughness. Since roughness directly affects the ride quality 5 experienced by road users, it is a good indicator for measuring pavement condition and has been 6 widely used both in the U.S. and internationally (19) (20) (21) . Based on a previous study (22) a 7 linearized deterioration was adopted: 8 γ γ γ γ where = roughness of the pavement of the facility in year n, and 9 = maintenance activities in the previous year. 10 is measured in a new set of units -Quarter car Index (QI), where QI =13×IRI (23).
11
IRI is the International Roughness Index, a measurement of pavement roughness in (m/km). 12 Thus, the lower the value of , the better is the pavement condition. In this project, a minimum 13 requirement of the pavement conditions is set as the following: 14 θ where θ = the maximum limit of the roughness of the pavement.. 15
As traffic volume ( ) is one of the major factors that impact pavement deterioration 16 process, it is explicitly considered in this pavement deterioration function. represents the 17 average impacts based on the vehicle configurations. 18
19
Objective function 20
The objective is to maximize the profit for a concessionaire. The objective function can be 21 expressed as: 22
Maximize J ∑ 23 where J = overall profit for the private sector. 24
Year n = 1 corresponds to the opening year of the project, and year 0 is included for the 25 purpose of initialization. A discount term is not included in the objective function because the 26 dollar value in the opening year of the project is used as the unit for calculating annual profit ( ). 27 That is, the real value which adjusts for the effect of inflation is adopted. In this way, the toll rate 28 as well as the coefficients in the cost function can be expressed in dollar value of the opening 29 year. As there is no lag in the profit function (i), revenue function (ii), and cost function (iii By solving this model, the private parties can find the toll-pricing strategies and the M&R 24 activity plan to optimize their profit complying with the concession agreement. The public sector 25 can apply the model to study the impact of different regulations on operational and financial 26 phases of the project. Even though the values for some of the variables in the models are pre-27 determined in practice (e.g., levels of maintenance), the model can help highway agencies to 28 study the impact of different pre-defined values on the overall management of the DBFO project. 29 Therefore, this proposed model provides a useful tool for decision makers in both the public and 30 the private sectors to make more informed decisions, including the study of optimal strategies to 31 seek the investment return and the determination of the pre-defined regulations in the contract. 32 33 CASE STUDY 34
The above model was implemented in GAMS using the nonlinear programming solver (24). The 35 model discussed above provides a realistic way of simulating how the toll rates and M&R 36 activities impact the system by taking into account the travel choices and the pavement 37 deterioration process. With the proposed model, the optimal policies that maximize the objective 38 function can also be evaluated. In equation (iii), annual growth rate of the travel demand was set to 1%, and therefore the 18 value of was 1.01. Considering the length of this toll road at 40 miles, the designed toll rate 19 was set to $10. The score for desired pavement condition was set to 40, the roughness 20 score for newly built pavements. Coefficient which was set to -6000 indicates that a 10-21 percent increase in toll rate will lead to a decrease of 600 vehicles per day in the traffic demand. 22
Similarly, a 10% deterioration in the prevailing pavement condition will lead to a decrease of 23 300 vehicle per day in demand with equal to -3000. 24
In equation (iv), the construction costs for the 40-mile toll road was estimated by the 25 private investor at 1,000 million dollars. The parameters 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 are for constant costs or 26 units cost, and was discussed earlier, these are infrastructure dependent variables. 27 In equation (v), the parameter was set as 0.00016 indicating that with an annual 28 average traffic volume (AADT) of 10,000 vehicles per day, the pavement roughness score would 29 increase 1.6 per year. Since vehicles with varying sizes and weight will pose different damages 30 to the pavement, only represents the average impacts based on the vehicle configurations for 31 this particular project. The truck percentage is assumed to be 13.5 percent in this case study. As 32 the ratio of cars and trucks changes, the value of this parameter needs to be adjusted accordingly. 33
In equation (vi) and (vii), the limits for the minimum pavement conditions and the 34 maximum toll were set to be 60 and $25, respectively. These values can be changed according to 35 concession agreements. 36
The initial values of the pavement roughness score and traffic volume were set to 40 and 37 14,000 vehicles per day respectively. 38 39
Discussion of numerical results 40 Figure 1 illustrates the optimal solutions for policy variables. Figure 2 shows the optimal paths 41 for some of the state variables. In Figure 1 and Figure 2 In the starting stage (n = 1, 2), low toll rates and well maintained highway can attract a 3 higher number of potential users switching from other alternative routes to the toll road, for not 4 only this stage but also the following years, which contributes to higher revenue. The optimal 5 solution suggests that, for the first year, no tolls should be charged so that a rapid increase in 6 demand can be achieved for the toll road. This observation connects well with the industry 7 practice where several toll roads have used similar strategies in their initial years of operations. 8
From year 3 through year 30 of the concession period, the system functions in a stable 9 stage, where the toll price is fixed at a level slightly higher than the designed toll rate. This 10 period would also need M&R treatments due to the pavement deterioration process, as doing so 11 helps maintain the demand at its upper limit of 24,000 vehicles per day as indicated in Figure 2  12 (d). The optimal solutions for this stage lie on the boundary of the feasible region; however, this 13 might not always be the case when different parameter values are used. For example, if the unit 14 pavement maintenance cost were increased by some amount, the optimal solutions could be 15 contingent upon a trade-off between the maintenance costs and the revenue generated. 16 For the ending stage (n= 31 to 35), the optimal strategies suggest that with the current 17 regulations, no M&R treatment is needed to maintain the pavement conditions above the 18 required level and at the same time, the toll rate can be set higher. During this period, although 19 the pavement condition continuously deteriorates for 5 years, the minimum requirement of the 20 pavement conditions ( ) is still not violated. Also, the toll rate (π) increases significantly to $22, 21 but it is still in the predefined range, in which requires the highest rate below $25. Introducing an economic shock in the demand function 8 A 3-year economic shock (E) from year 15 to year 17 was introduced in the demand function to 9 evaluate its impact on the proposed model. An economic shock that reduces the travel demand 10 can occur due to several reasons including: an increase in oil prices, a recession in the economy, 11 and others. 12
Figures 3 and 4 indicate the optimal solutions for policy variables and state variables 13 under an economic shock scenario. Comparing these results with the previously discussed 14 scenarios (without the economic shock), it can be observed that the toll rates during these three 15 years (n =15 to 17) need to be reduced in order to accommodate the declined traffic demand due 16 to economic hardship. As a result of the decreased toll rates, the annual profit of the 17 concessionaire would also decrease during these three years. On the other hand, the reduced toll 18 rates maintain the traffic volume, which should have dropped because of the economic shock and 19 thus optimizes the whole project in terms of the overall profit. As it can be observed, the optimal 20 paths for other variables do not change. This paper discussed a toll-pricing model for investigating the applicability of dynamic 13 optimization models for determining optimal toll pricing in DBFO projects. By simulating the 14 process of a concessionaire to make optimal investment decisions while providing agreed 15 services, the proposed model provides feasible toll-pricing strategies that can help improve 16 with zero-to-very-low toll rates in the initial stages, while maintaining the highway in excellent 5 condition to attract the maximum number of potential users. Going into the next stage of the 6 concession period, the toll rates increase and certain amount of M&R activities are undertaken to 7 maintain the pavement conditions. Towards the end of the concession period, high toll rates are 8 charged to maximize profit; this period is a critical time to regulate highway facility management 9 to ensure that the private sector continues to provide good service. Also, the proposed model is 10 able to factor in the effect of exogenous economic shocks to the system and examine what could 11 be the optimal strategy to adopt in such a situation. In summary, the proposed model can be 12 applied as a tool for decision makers in both the public and the private sectors to make more 13 informed decisions, including the study of optimal strategies to seek the investment return, 14 strategies to handle financial risks, and the determination of predefined regulations in the 15 contract. 16 Future scope of work for this study may include incorporating additional features. With 17 the parameters in the present numerical study, the ratio of cost-to-revenue for M&R activities is 18 much lower when compared to the other policy variable (toll rate). Thus, the optimal solutions 19 always choose to maintain the pavement in the best possible condition. This is so because ratio 20 of M&R activities could be relatively low during the period where lower toll rates are introduced 21 to attract more users. However, this might not always be the case. Future work can also evaluate 22 other configurations of the parameters to describe project characteristics in other situations, and 23 assess how the M&R activities impact results. Second, the demand function adopted in this study 24 is limited to analyze travelers' choice based on travel time, tolls, ride quality, and other factors 25 on the toll road. It would be also interesting to explore how these factors on other alternate routes 26 influence the travelers' choice at a network level. Third, the model developed in this study is 27 deterministic in nature. A stochastic model that can consider uncertainties in the model should be 28 used so that the results would be closer to the real-world scenario. 29
